September 27

Blog #101 – Using atomic bombs on Japan

So, we talked about the use of the atomic bombs on Japan to end the war.  In the notes on Okinawa’s influence on the decision to use the bomb taken from the book, Ripples of Battle by Victor David Hanson, he listed several reasons why he thought the bombs should have been used.  One of the most persuasive points that he stated was the “Manchurian bloodbath” that could have been expected between the 1.6 million Soviet troops vs. 1 million Japanese troops if Japan did not surrender.

However, a lot of second guessing has gone into America’s use of atomic bombs on Japan in August 1945, even starting with former general and future president Dwight Eisenhower in 1948 who did not want America to be the first to use nuclear weapons.

According to the article in Portrait of America“The Biggest Decision: Why We Had to Drop the Atomic Bomb” by Robert J. Maddox, the author worked on dispelling some of the myths that have popped up since 1945.  The generals may have overestimated the Allied casualties, but the June 8 meeting with Truman stated that General George Marshall estimated that only 31,000 casualties would be inflicted during the invasion of Kyushu (Operation Olympic).  What intelligence sources had discovered in the days before Hiroshima, the Japanese Imperial Command had correctly guessed what the Allies were planning and had reinforced Kyushu with over 500,000 (actually over 900,000 but the Allies didn’t know that at the time).

So, logic follows that Truman made the decision to drop the bomb in order to spare more lives, mainly American lives, from a costly invasion.

But did Truman drop the bombs to intimidate the Soviets?  The war in Europe was over, and critics have claimed that the U.S. was trying to get the Soviets to either withdraw from Eastern Europe or at least be more open to agreeing with U.S. demands.  However, Stalin was given the info about the success of the Trinity test (from spies) and therefore knew about the atomic bomb while at the Potsdam Conference in July 1945.   Whether or not he felt intimidated was not recorded, therefore is not known.

Another sticking point was whether Japan was ready to surrender.  According to the Maddox article, Japan had sent peace feelers out through the Soviets but some members of the Japanese government (those with the power) wanted to continue fighting to protect Emperor Hirohito from prosecution of war crimes (because German leaders were going to be tried for the Holocaust).  What role Hirohito played has been (and still is) debated, but the military could see the writing on the wall with the prosecutions beginning in Germany after the discovery of the concentration camps.  Would the emperor be retained as part of the Allies sticking to unconditional surrender terms?  Or, as Truman had mentioned, would they soften on this one sticking point in order to end the war earlier to save hundreds of thousands of lives?   The problem with interpreting the signals sent by the Japanese government at this time is that it sent mixed signals depending upon who was being asked.  If it was a military officer, he was willing to fight to the end.  If it was a politician, some kind of compromise was possible by the summer of 1945.

Furthermore, what would have happened to the Allied prisoners of war captured by the Japanese scattered throughout Asia if the Allies had invaded Japan in November 1945?  Chances are, they might have been killed or tortured so they wouldn’t be of any use to an invading Allied army.

Is it possible to judge an historical era from 70 yrs later, especially one so fraught with controversy since the 1994 Smithsonian exhibit?   See links below:

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/greg-mitchell/for-64th-anniversary-the_b_252752.html

http://www.nytimes.com/1994/08/30/us/smithsonian-alters-plans-for-its-exhibit-on-hiroshima-bomb.html

Your job: examine at least 2 of the issues discussed in the blog (things Truman probably had on his mind when weighing the decision to drop the bomb), and use/reference at least two of the documents (the notes on Okinawa, “The Final Act” article, and the Portrait).

What would you have advised President Truman do under these circumstances especially if you didn’t know what the outcome would be?  Why?  (You can pretend you don’t know the results of the bombing or not – I leave it up to you).

350 words minimum answer. 

Due Monday, October 2 by class.  

May 11

Blog #18 – Rethinking the Atomic Bombs

A lot of second guessing has gone into America’s use of atomic bombs on Japan in August 1945, even starting with former general and future president Dwight Eisenhower in 1948 who did not want America to be the first to use nuclear weapons.

According to the previous article in Portrait of America, “The Biggest Decision: Why We Had to Drop the Atomic Bomb” by Robert J. Maddox, the author worked on disspelling some of the myths that have popped up since 1945.  The generals may have overestimated the Allied casualties, but the June 8 meeting with Truman stated that General George Marshall estimated that only 31,000 casualties would be inflicted during the invasion of Kyushu (Operation Olympic).  What intelligence sources had discovered in the days before Hiroshima, the Japanese Imperial Command had correctly guessed what the Allies were planning and had reinforced Kyushu with over 500,000 (actually over 900,000 but the Allies didn’t know that at the time). 

So, logic follows that Truman made the decision to drop the bomb in order to spare more lives, mainly American lives, from a costly invasion. 

But did Truman drop the bombs to intimidate the Soviets?  The war in Europe was over, and critics have claimed that the U.S. was trying to get the Soviets to either withdraw from Eastern Europe or at least be more open to agreeing with U.S. demands.  However, Stalin was given the info about the success of the Trinity test (from spies) and therefore knew about the atomic bomb.   Whether or not he felt intimidated was not recorded. 

Another sticking point was whether Japan was ready to surrender.  According to the Maddox article, Japan had sent peace feelers out through the Soviets but some members of the Japanese government (those with the power) wanted to continue fighting to protect Emperor Hirohito from prosecution of war crimes.  What role he played has been (and still is) debated, but the military could see the writing on the wall with the prosecutions beginning in Germany after the discovery of the concentration camps.  Would the emperor be retained as part of the Allies sticking to unconditional surrender terms?  Or, as Truman had mentioned, would they soften on this one sticking point in order to end the war earlier to save hundreds of thousands of lives?   The problem with interpreting the signals sent by the Japanese government at this time is that it sent mixed signals depending upon who was being asked.  If it was a military officer, he was willing to fight to the end.  If it was a politician, some kind of compromise was possible by the summer of 1945. 

Furthermore, what would have happened to the Allied prisoners of war captured by the Japanese scattered throughout Asia if the Allies had invaded Japan in November 1945?  Chances are, they might have been killed or tortured so they wouldn’t be of any use to an invading Allied army. 

Is it possible to judge an historical era from 70 yrs later, especially one so fraught with controversy since the 1994 Smithsonian exhibit?   See links below:

http://www.afa.org/media/enolagay/chrono.asp

http://www.nytimes.com/1994/08/30/us/smithsonian-alters-plans-for-its-exhibit-on-hiroshima-bomb.html

Your job: examine at least 2 of the issues discussed in the blog (things Truman probably had on his mind when weighing the decision to drop the bomb), and use/reference at least two of the documents in the handout I gave you today (Wed. May 11).  What would you have advised President Truman do under these circumstances?  Why? 

Due Thursday, May 12.  250 words.